Case Digest by Raphael Elijah K. Galvan and Vince C. Glorioso
FACTS: The case questions the applicability of Republic Act 9262 also known as Anti-Violence Against Women and Children (VAWC) wherein the perpetrator is a woman. Maria Alexandria Bisquerra was in a four-year relationship with Roselyn Agacid up until March 2014. On August 31, 2014, Bisquerra met up with Agacid in Cubao, Quezon City with the intention to simply return the belongings of the latter. However, Agacid who was hopeful that they could patch up their relationship took a dark turn when Bisquerra insisted on their break up which led the former to slap and stab the latter on her right forearm with a cutter. Shocked, Bisquerra fled and sought help from the guards within the area, but Agacid had already escaped.
Bisquerra filed a suit against Agacid on the grounds of violation of Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 9262 before the Quezon City RTC. Agacid contested that VAWC cannot be applied to her considering that the law’s intent was to protect women and children from the abusive acts of men and not women. RTC ruled against Agacid. CA affirmed the same. Before the Supreme Court, Agacid asserted that RTC and CA erred in relying solely on the Garcia vs. Drilon ruling, there having substantial distinctions between a man and a woman.
ISSUE: Whether R.A. 9262 imposes penalties on women in lesbian relationships.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. First, the Supreme Court declared that violence against women is a power issue, not a gender issue. Citing Justice Leonen’s separate opinion in Garcia v. Drilon, such an issue could be traced in history where women were portrayed as a subject of dominance, hence perceived by society as weak. Thus, “[s]ome women, because gender is a cultural issue, can also imbibe the patriarchal culture that other women are reduced to weak objects when they are in intimate relationships.”
Second, Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment, or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. The phrase “committed by any person,” pertaining to the offender, is a gender-neutral term. The Supreme Court agrees with the Solicitor General that resorting to legislative intent is not necessary because there is no ambiguity in the provisions of the law.
Lastly, while Garcia is indeed an obiter dictum in this case, the Court in Jacinto v. Fouts already made the same pronouncement above. Jacinto involved a woman in a lesbian relationship, her partner was charged of violating R.A. 9262, and during the trial, the accused also moved to quash the charges. Furthermore, Jacinto shows that the law is not discriminatory to men, as it applies even if the offender is also a woman.
In sum, the protection given by law to women subjected to violence looks not into the identity of the perpetrator. As long as the victim is a woman, it is enough to call for the operation of the provisions of R.A. 9262 and hence there is no reason why the foregoing could not apply to Agacid.